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Empirical studies of price transmission often suggest that imperfect pass-through may 
be due to market power exerted by food retailers. However, these econometric studies 
essentially lack any formal basis for tying the role of market power with data 
comprising of retail and producer prices only. We show that if market power has an 
effect on the farm-retail margin, this determines the specification of the cointegrating 
relationship. To emphasise the relevance of the tests, we focus on results relating the 
UK beef sector and show that market power is likely to have played a role in 
determining the retail-farm price margin.  
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In recent years, there have been a large number of empirical studies that have focused 
on price transmission between the retail and farm sectors with a view to testing 
whether price changes at one stage are fully passed through to the other. Typically, in 
the absence of perfect price transmission, the authors will assume that one important 
candidate for imperfect price transmission is market power in the stages linking the 
retail and farm sectors. A typical (though simplified) example of this would be to 
have data on price pairs (retail and producer), test whether there is evidence of 
cointegration and explore the dynamics linking these prices together. In the absence 
of a cointegrating relationship and/or the result of perfect (often unitary) price 
transmission between prices, there is an appeal to the theoretical literature on price 
transmission which highlights the role of market power (see below). However, while 
the econometric techniques applied can have varying degrees of sophistication, little 
effort is paid to the underlying structure of the basic model, particularly if one is 
trying to identify a role for market power in determining the result. This is the issue 
that is addressed in this paper. Specifically, we outline a procedure that will determine 
the structure of the cointegrating regression if market power is likely to be present. 
The attractive feature of this test is that it is (a) essentially simple to apply and (b) 
provides a more formal basis for addressing the role of market power on price 
transmission in the food chain and (c) avoids the researcher appealing to ad hoc 
factors in explaining imperfect price transmission that several econometric studies 
typically find.  
 
It should also be noted that the issue of retail-farm level price transmission is not 
confined to academic debate but is also frequently highlighted in public policy as a 
means for inferring the misuse of market power. For example, several studies by the 
UK anti-trust authority (the Competition Commission and its predecessor the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission) have often highlighted the role of market 
power in determining how price relationships should evolve. To take the recent report 
into market power potentially exercised by food retailers, emphasis was given to price 
transmission both in terms of the reasons for the investigation in the first place and in 
terms of evidence based on econometric studies relating to the dynamics of price 
adjustment at the retail and farm levels
1. A more recent report commissioned by the 
UK Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA, 2004) also 
focused on price transmission as a follow up to the Competition Commission report 
with the remit being whether market power potentially exercised by retailers 
influenced the price transmission relationship. The latter report highlights the type of 
issues that this paper addresses since a close reading of this report casts doubt on 
whether their results can really substantiate the claims being made. This is because 
there is little tie in with the theory with the empirics and therefore makes their 
econometric strategy and the subsequent interpretation of their results questionable.  
 
                                                           
1 The Competition Commission noted one of their main concerns being to address: '...[the] public 
perception of...an apparent disparity between farm-gate and retail prices...which is seen as evidence by 
some that grocer multiples were profiting from the crisis in the farming industry'. (Competition 
Commission, Vol. 1, p.3, 2000) 
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The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we briefly review the theoretical 
literature linking price transmission with market power in the food sector. In section 
3, we outline a simple theoretical model that forms the basis for the structure of the 
cointegrating relationship. This framework forms the basis for our empirical tests 
which we apply to 10 commodity sectors using retail and farm prices in the UK. 
However, given space constraints, we focus solely on the results from the UK beef 
sector in some detail. This is reported in section 4. We also outline briefly outline the 
results for other commodity sectors. Section 5 summarises and concludes. 
 
2. Linking Price Transmission with Market Power 
There is a broad literature on the issue of the margin between the retail and farm 
levels and what factors may influence it. The most notable early paper on this issue 
was by Gardner (1975) which identified a range of factors that would influence the 
price transmission between the farm and retail sectors.  Gardner assumed perfect 
competition which clearly does not fit with the concerns raised by the UK anti-trust 
authorities. To this end, McCorriston et al. (1998) show that oligopoly power in the 
food sector would have an impact on determining the price transmission elasticity 
following a supply side shock depending on the functional form of the demand curve 
while McCorriston et al. (2001) show that the extent of returns to scale characterising 
the food industry cost function will also be important. Other important influences of 
the retail-farm margin and hence price transmission are likely to be oligopsony power 
(Lloyd et al., 2002), and the source of the exogenous shock (i.e. whether the shift 
occurs in the retail demand or farm supply function (Gardner, op. cit.)).  
 
In the theoretical framework outlined below, we draw on the previous literature to 
highlight the potential role of market power on the retail-farm margin. However, 
rather than derive an explicit price transmission elasticity, we use the framework to 
determine the econometric strategy in linking price transmission with market power. 
Specifically, we show that if market power characterises the UK food sector then both 
the exogenous demand and supply shifters should enter the reduced form retail-farm 
margin equation. If market power is not a feature of the sector, then there would be no 
a priori case for the inclusion of the shifters and the margin simply reflects marketing 
costs. Therefore, while we do not retrieve an explicit measure of market power, 
market power will nevertheless influence the outcome if the demand and supply 
shifters are found to be statistically significant in the reduced form model of the retail-
farm gate margin. In addition, we also relate the results to the derivation of impulse 
response functions since these should be explicitly about the impact of a shifter on 
relative prices rather than a change in one of the prices only which therefore ties in 
precisely with the theoretical work on price transmission. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
The demand function for the processed product is given by: 
                                          (1)  ) , , ( X R R h Q
s =
where  R  is the retail price of the good under consideration and 
s R is the price of a 
substitute good which firms in this sector take as given.  X  is the demand shifter. The 
supply function of the agricultural raw material is given by (in inverse form): 
 
                                              ) , ( N A k P =  (2) 
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where   is the quantity of the agricultural raw material and   is the exogenous 
shifter in the farm supply equation. 
A N
 
For a representative firm, the profit function is given by: 
 
                              ) ( ) ( ) ( i i i i i Q C A A P Q Q R − − = π  (3) 
where   is other costs and, assuming a fixed proportions technology,    
where   is the input:output coefficient which is assumed to equal 1. This assumption 
corresponds closely to the construction of the data in the vertical market chain used in 
the empirical analysis that follows
i C a A Q i i / =
a
2. The first-order condition for profit maximisation 
is given by: 
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In order to get an explicit solution, consider linear functional forms for equations (1) 
and (2) and assume  :  1 = a
  
                                                                                               (1’)  cX eR bR h Q
s + + − =
                                                          gS k P + =                                                        (2’) 
with domestic supply being given by: 
 
N Q S + =  
where  is the level of exports which are exogenously determined. From this, and a 
aggregating over n-firms, (4) can be re-written as: 
N
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where θ and  µ represent the conjectures relating to oligopoly and oligopsony power 
respectively. These parameters can be interpreted as an index of market power with 
0 = = µ θ  representing competitive behaviour and  1 = = µ θ  representing collusive 
behaviour.  M  represents other costs that enter the industry cost function which are 
assumed to be marketing costs, the price of which is taken as given. Assume for ease 
of interpretation, θ  and µ  are n-firm weighted indices of market power where   is 
small. Using (1’), (2’) and (4’), we can derive an explicit solution for the endogenous 
variables: 
n
                           
) 1 ( ) 1 (
) (
µ θ + + +
+ + − + +
=
bg
gN k M b eR cX h
Q
s
                                                 (5) 
         
) 1 ( ) 1 (




+ + + + + + + + +
=
bg
gN k M eR cX h g b eR cX h
R
s s
                         (6) 
 
           
) 1 ( ) 1 (




− + + + + + + +
=
bg
bM cX eR h g gN k bg gN k
P
s
                          (7) 
 
To derive the retail-farm spread, use (6) and (7) to give: 
                                                           
2  In the commodity sectors studied, care was taken to select products where the technology would be 
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Note that if neither oligopoly nor oligopsony power matters in the determining the 
retail-farm price spread (i.e.  0 = = µ θ ), then equation (8) reduces to: 
 
                                               M P R = −                                                                (9) 
i.e. the source of the retail-farm price margin in a perfectly competitive industry is due 
to marketing costs only. In this case, the role of the exogenous shifters play no role in 
determining the spread. This is not to say that they do not affect each price 
individually, but in a perfectly competitive industry they play no role in determining 
the relative gap between the prices at each stage of the food chain. Correspondingly, if 
either oligopoly and/or oligospony power in the food sector is important, then they 
will influence the margin between retail and farm prices. In other words, each shifter 
will affect the two prices differentially and thus the margin between the prices will 
change.  
 
Equations (6)-(8) form the basis for the structure of the econometric model. Consider 
first of all equation (8) that relates to the retail-farm spread. Note that if market power 
in some form does characterise the UK food sector, then the exogenous supply and 
demand shifters should enter our econometric model of the margin between retail and 
farm prices. Hence there are two aspects to linking theory on market power and price 
transmission and the specification of the econometric model. First, one should test for 
cointegration in the presence of exogenous shifters rather than price pairs alone. The 
latter is insufficient to draw any implications about the potential role of market power 
in price relationships. Second, and following from the specification of the 
cointegrating relationship, the test for the existence of market power is whether the 
coefficients on these variables in the retail-farm spread equation are statistically 
significant. If market power does play a role, then this will influence the retail and 
farm level prices to varying degrees. Finally, to the extent that (either of) these 
shifters are significant, we can therefore use (6) or (7) with (8) to derive the impact of 
exogenous shifters on retail and farm prices with  capturing the farm-level shifts 
and 
N
X capturing the impact of the demand shifter at the retail level using impulse 
response functions to trace out the implied price transmission relationship between 
farm and retail prices. Note however that the source of shock that underpins the 
impulse response relates to the presence of the shifter at either the farm or retail level 
(or both) and hence directly links the theoretical model with the econometric approach 
and not a ‘shock’ characterised by a change in one of the prices that forms the price 
pair. 
 
We collected data for 10 commodity sectors in the UK and cover the period 1990-
2002. The data covers farm and retail prices for the following sectors: beef, lamb, 
pork, chicken, sugar, milk, fresh fruit, coffee and eggs. To characterise the shifters, 
we separated the meats sectors from others in that over the data period, the meats 
sector was affected by the BSE crisis in the mid-1990s. In this case, we had data that 
explicitly characterised the food scare and the impact of the export ban and the cull in 
the beef sector. For the other sectors, the demand shifter related to the UK food retail 
price index on the basis that any shocks to demand will be indicated by changes in 
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this overall index. To capture supply shocks, we used the index of prices of purchases 
by UK agriculture on the basis that any shocks to agriculture will be reflected in the 
derived demand for farm inputs. However, due to space constraints and the 
technicalities associated with the econometric tests, for present purposes we focus 
only on the specification for the UK beef sector. Specifically, in the following 
empirical section, we apply this theoretical framework using data from the UK beef 
market that explicitly accounts for demand and supply side shifters.  
 
4. Econometric Issues 
General  
In this section, we detail the econometric methodology relating to issues identifying 
cointegration in the presence of shifters through to the use of impulse response 
functions where the shifters themselves may be endogenous in the long-run 
relationship between all variables in the system. As a starting point note that since 
prices are likely to be non-stationary and cointegrated, it is appropriate to couch the 
empirical analysis in a vector autoregressive (VAR) framework (Hendry and Doornik, 
p129, 2001). Consider a VAR(p) model: 
 
               t t p t p t t t ε Ψ Φ Φ Φ + + + + + = − − − w x x x x   .   .   .   2 2 1 1  (10) 
where   is a ( t x 1 × m ) vector ( ) of jointly determined I(1) variables, 
 is a ( ) vector of deterministic and or exogenous variables and each   
( ) and 
m .,   .   .    j,   i,   .,   .   .   , 2 , 1
t w 1 × q i Φ
p i , , 1K = Ψ are ( ) and ( m m× q m× ) matrices of coefficients to be estimated 
by Johansens’s (1988) maximum likelihood procedure using a (t = 1, . . .T) sample of 
data.   is a ( ) vector of n.i.d. disturbances with zero mean and non-diagonal 
covariance matrix, 
t ε 1 × m
Σ.   
 
The error correction representation of (10) is observationally equivalent but facilitates 
estimation and hypothesis testing since all terms are stationary (Hendry and Doornik, 
p.60, op. cit.). This re-parameterisation is given by: 
                             ∑
−
=






t t i t i p t t ε Ψ ∆ Γ αβ ∆ w x x x  (11) 
Attention focuses on the ( r n× ) matrix of co-integrating vectors, β, that quantify the 
‘long-run’ (or equilibrium) relationships between the variables in the system and the 
( r n× ) matrix of error correction coefficients, α, the elements of which load 
deviations from equilibrium (i.e.  ) into ∆x k t ' − x β t, for correction. The   coefficients 
in (11) estimate the short-run effect of shocks on ∆x
Γi
t, and thereby allow the short and 
long-run responses to differ. 
 
Given the proceeding discussion, β may represent the economic linkages that bind 
the prices together in the long run. As section 3 demonstrates, these linkages occur 
either between substitutes at the retail level or between marketing stages for a single 
good and as such provide the identifying restrictions required to interpret the 
cointegrating relationships in an economically meaningful way.
3 However, as 
Lütkephol and Riemers (1992) make clear, despite offering estimates of the ‘long 
                                                           
3 Like any set of equations, the usual rank and order conditions must be satisfied if   is to be unique 




run’, they are by construction partial derivatives predicated on the ceteris paribus 
assumption.  When the variables in a cointegrated system are characterised by rich 
dynamic interaction (such that   affects   and   affects  , possibly with lags 
and/or through other variables), inference based upon ‘everything else held constant’ 
may have limited value.  If what is actually wanted is an estimate of what might 
happen following a specific shock, then impulse response analysis, which takes 
account of these interactions, provides a tractable and potentially attractive solution. 
Whilst impulse response functions are readily calculated from reduced forms such as 
(11), knowledge of the structural economic representation from which (11) derives is 
required if the correlations upon which the impulse response functions are based are 
to be legitimately attributed to economic (causal) mechanisms.  
1 x 2 x 2 x 1 x
 
As we shall see, it is the dynamic effect of shocks to the supply and demand shifters 
that are sought. While these have an intuitively ‘structural’ interpretation, in that the 
shifters reflect influences that can be reasonably thought of as driving prices rather 
than being driven by them, it is straightforward to formalise. To do so consider the 
structural economic representation of (11), namely:
4
 
                                                           (12)  [] ∑
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∆ ~ ~ ∆
p
i
t t i t i p t t ν Ψ Γ β α w x x x A
where   represents the   matrix of coefficients defining the contemporaneous 
structural linkages in the system, 
A 6 6×
α α A = ~ ,  i i Γ Γ A = ~ ,  Ψ Ψ A =
~
 and  
                                                         t t ε ν A =                                                          (13) 
are the structural shocks which, as pure disturbances, are assumed to be serially 
uncorrelated and uncorrelated with each other with zero means and diagonal variance-
covariance matrix,  ' ] ' [ A AΣ ν ν Ω = = t t E  (Hamilton, 1994, p.329). The   
restrictions on   (one normalisation and five homogenous linear restrictions per 
equation) required for exact identification of (12) is overly rigorous for our purposes 
since all we require is that the two shifter equations be identified.  Decomposing 
 where, using the notation from the previous section, 
denotes the shifters and  denotes the prices, we may 
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4  Shocks to (say) the price of a substitute are less obviously ‘structural’ since they themselves are 
likely to reflect shocks to other meat prices. 
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Exact identification of the equations in  t 1 x ∆  (and the impulse response functions 
associated with them) is achieved providing:  
 

































The first set of restrictions state that prices are not contemporaneously causal for the 
shifters; the second, that the shifters themselves are contemporaneously unrelated; and 
the third, that shocks to the shifters are orthogonal to each other. Given that we can 
safely assume that the contemporaneous causality is from the shifters to prices rather 
than vice versa and that each shifter reflects changes in disparate parts of the economy 
and are thus unrelated, the equations comprising  t 1 x ∆  are  exactly identified. This is 
helpful empirically since the impulse response functions of the variables contained in 
 do not require the equations in  t 1 x ∆ t 2 x ∆  to be identified nor is  a 
requirement so that shocks between prices and shifters need not be orthogonal.
0 12 = Ω
5  
 
In what follows, we use the generalised impulse response function (Koop et al. 1996, 
Pesaran and Shin, 1998) to assess the impact of demand and supply side shocks that 
characterised the BSE crisis in the UK on beef prices at both retail and farm levels. 
These are used to: (a) infer whether the food sector is characterised by market power 
as reflected in equation (8) and, (b) gauge the relative importance of the demand and 
supply shocks that characterise the BSE crisis arising by combining equation (6) or 
(7) with (8). Note then there is an explicit tie with market power and price 
transmission and the role of the shifters in relation to the impulse response functions 
which is consistent with the theoretical approached to this issue. 
 
Data for the Beef Sector 
Monthly price data spanning January 1990 to December 2000 are supplied by the 
UK’s Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA).
6  Retail price 
series on beef, pork, and lamb are those collected as part of the UK’s Meat and 
Livestock Commission Retail Prices Survey.  The survey covers purchases in a 
variety of retailers (such as independent butchers and supermarkets) in 21 locations in 
England and Wales.  A representative retail price for each meat is constructed through 
aggregation of prices recorded for individual cuts according to their share in a carcass.  
The producer price of beef is derived from a weekly survey of average live-weight 
prices at 190 auctions market in Great Britain. All prices have been deflated by the 
retail price index (December 1999 base) and are measured in pence per kilogram 
(p/kg).  To facilitate comparison between retail and producer levels of the marketing 
chain all prices are expressed in ‘carcass weight equivalents’.  
 
These price data are augmented by two variables representing demand and supply 
shifters in the UK beef market.  To capture the importance of the BSE food scare, we 
use an index of media coverage based upon a count of newspaper articles per month 
                                                           
5 Since we use the generalised impulse response function (Koop et al. 1996, Pesaran and Shin, 1998) 
results are also invariant to the ordering of the variables in   (see Garratt et al., 2003).  t 1 x
6  Details regarding the collection and transformation of data are in MAFF (1999). 
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on the food and health related issues in four national quality newspapers.
7  Whilst not 
exclusively about the crisis, BSE and its implications for the safety of beef 
consumption dominates the index, although reports about other scares such as E Coli 
157 and related issues such as abattoir hygiene and cholesterol are also recorded. 
Supply side shocks of BSE are incorporated in a variable called Net Withdrawals, 
( ) which represents the sum of net exports (of live cattle, fresh and frozen beef) 
and cattle removed from the food chain as part of the UK Government’s official cull 
of old and infected cattle. The data are expressed in thousand tonnes of carcass weight 
equivalent.    
t NW
5. Empirical  Results 
As an initial step, the data are tested for the order of integration. The series used 
comprise 132 monthly observations on retail prices of beef, pork, lamb ( n d  
 respectively), the producer price of beef ( ), the Meat Scares Index ( ) and 
net withdrawals of beef from the UK market ( ).
t t RP RB , a
t RL t PB t s
t NW
8  The ADF results are reported 




Using these data, equation (10) is estimated for  5 , , 1K = p  unrestricted seasonals and 
intercepts restricted to the cointegration space.  The Akaike Information Criterion 
selects a VAR(2) model, and diagnostic testing for residual auto-correlation, ARCH, 
and heteroscedasticity does not suggest departure from stated assumptions at the 5% 
level using either vector or equation-based tests. The null of normally distributed 
residuals is however strongly rejected owing to the presence of outliers in most of the 
equations around April 1996, corresponding to the Ministerial announcement in the 
UK linking BSE and vCJD.  
 
Cointegration Analysis 
Cointegration results, reported in Table 2, show two large eigenvalues, pointing to the 
presence of two equilibrium (stationary) relations among the variables.  The formal 
cointegration tests (Johansen 1988) confirm the presence of two cointegrating 
relationships at the 5% level, as indeed visual inspection of the cointegrating residuals 
might suggest (see Appendix)





                                                           
7 The newspapers are The Times, Sunday Times; Guardian, Observer. The count is compiled by Euro-
PA Associates of Northampton, UK (www.euro-pa.co.uk).  
8 Being a potentially important substitute for beef, the retail price of chicken was included but was 
found to be stationary about broken mean at the 1% significance level according to Perron (1989) 
tests.  Another potentially important variable, marketing costs (proxied here by unit labour costs in 
UK manufacturing), was found to be I(1), but both were found to be redundant in the cointegration 
analysis and are excluded from the models reported here. 
9 Application of Perron (1989, 1997) tests to the price series used here, and reported in Sanjuán and 
Dawson (2003) confirm the presence of a unit root in all price series when allowing for a break in 
both level and level and trend. Similar testing on the shifters,  and  , arrives at the same 
conclusion.   
t NW t s
10 In the absence of any evidence of a break in the level or trend of these residuals during 1996 we do 
not apply the Johansen et al. (2000) cointegration tests that allow for structural breaks. 
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Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Variable   Levels (lag)  Differences (lag)  Inference 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
   -1.73  (0)  -10.98**  (0)  ~I(1)   t RB t RB
   -1.65  (0)  -9.87**  (0)  ~I(1)  t RP t RP
   -2.23  (3)  -7.39**  (2)  ~I(1)  t RL t RL
   -2.47  (2)  -6.63**  (0)  ~I(1)  t PB t PB
    -3.17 (7)   -6.33** (10)  ~I(1)  t NW t NW
    -2.76  (7)  -5.87** (0)       ~I(1)  t s t s
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: Lag length of the ADF regression is selected according to the Akaike Information Criterion and 
reported in parentheses adjacent to test statistic; the Augmented Dickey Fuller regression includes a 
constant and trend (and seasonals for lamb) for the levels and constant (and seasonals for lamb) in 
differences; critical values derived by MacKinnon (1991); 5% significance denoted by *, 1% by **. 
 
 
Table 2: Cointegration Test Statistics  
 
Eigenvalues:    0.37 0.28 0.17 0.05 0.03  0.0 
    Trace  5% c.v  Maximal Eigenvalue  5% c.v.  0 H
   136.3**  102.1  59.3**  40.3  0 = r
  1 = r  77.0*  76.1  42.0**  34.4 
  2 = r  35.0 53.1  23.6  28.1 
   11.4 34.9  7.3  22.0  3 = r
  4 = r  4.1  20.0  3.9  15.7 
   0.3 9.2  0.3  9.2  5 = r
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: Critical values are asymptotic, derived by Osterwald-Lenum (1992); ** and * denote 
significance at 1% and 5% respectively.   
  
In the absence of additional restrictions, the long-run relations that have been detected 
are unidentified and merely represent statistical rather than meaningful economic 
relationships.  However, given the discussion in section 3, it is reasonable to assume 
that they represent the pricing relationships given by equations (6), (7) and (8), of 
which we would only expect to find two because the margin (8) is the linear 
combination of (6) and (7). In other words, any two of these equations will by 
definition determine the third. While the choice is arbitrary as to which two equations 
to identify, we specify a model in which producer prices are excluded from the first 
(retail) relation and enter the second (margin) relation with a unit coefficient. This 
yields the following (t ratios in parentheses): 
 
   (15) 
(0.17)       (-4.92)         (1.56)         (4.89)     (0.35)           
30 . 0 09 . 24 67 . 0 88 . 0 48 . 37 t t t t t NW s RL RP RB + − + + =
   (16) 
(-1.50)      (2.06)          (1.23)        (-1.14)   (-0.01)                           




Inspection of these suggest that they do indeed represent empirical analogues of the 
retail and margin relationships as described in (6) and (8). Specifically, note how the 
price of substitutes (  and  ) appear to be relevant in (15), the retail model, but 
not so in (16), the margin or price transmission relationship. Dropping insignificant 
regressors yields a final pair of cointegrating vectors given by:  
t RP t RL
 
                                                               (17)   
   (-3.63)          (4.13)        (3.22)           
07 . 30 99 . 0 74 . 0 t t t t s RL RP RB − + =
                                                                     (18)   
(-3.64)      (6.88)                            
86 . 3 71 . 33 ) ( t t t t NW s PB RB − = −
A likelihood ratio test supports the over-identifying restrictions embodied in (17) and 
(18) at the 5% level [ ;  p-value = 0.11] indicating that the model 
represents a congruent simplification of the data. All variables are correctly signed in 
both equations. Equation (17) describes the retail relationship and shows that as the 
prices of substitute goods rise, so does the retail price beef, in a manner indicative of 
substitution. Hence we would expect the presence of substitutes to partially offset the 
impact of the BSE crisis on price adjustment. The meat scares index ( ) enters 
equation (17) as a retail demand ‘shifter’, akin to 
1 . 9 ) 5 (
2 = χ
t s
X  in the theoretical model. The 
empirical results show that consumer concerns over the safety of meat, as measured 
by media activity, have a negative impact on the retail price of beef. However, 
because demand shocks are greater at producer rather than retail level, the effect of 
the index on the margin is to widen it, as can be seen in (18).  
 
Net withdrawals,   enters the margin equation (18) like   in the theoretical 
model, and as a supply ‘shifter’, it reduces the margin by raising producer prices by 
more than retail prices. In other words, a decrease in net withdrawals (such as an 
export ban) will lead, ceteris paribus, to an increase in supply on the domestic market 
and hence prices will fall.  
t NW N
 
Note that in the price margin equation (18), the two exogenous variables representing 
the shock to the farm supply function and the retail demand function respectively, are 
statistically significant at conventional levels.
11 Given our discussion following the 
derivation of equation (8), this implies that market power (either in the form of 
oligopoly or oligospony power or both) characterises the UK food sector. As such, the 
results suggest that we cannot reject the hypothesis that market power played a role in 
influencing the impact of the BSE crisis on the retail-farm margins in the latter half of 
the 1990s.  
 
The extent to which demand shocks at the retail level are passed back to farmers can 
be derived by re-writing (18) in terms of producer prices which gives:  
 
                               t t t t NW s RB PB 86 . 3 71 . 33 + − =  (19) 
                                                           
11  Note that t ratios are only asymptotically valid under cointegration although likelihood ratio 
exclusion tests confirm the statistical significance of these variables to at least one of these 
cointegrating relation in the system at the 1% level.   
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The negative coefficient on   shows that media activity also depresses producer 
prices ceteris paribus Also, changes in   that lead to a reduction in domestic 




Impulse response analysis 
Given that we have detected the presence of market power through the significance of 
the shifters, the next step is to examine the specific effects of each shock on beef 
prices. Prior to reporting the results from this exercise it is worthwhile to note that up 
to this point it has been assumed that all prices and shifters are potentially 
endogenous. If the shifters are actually exogenous for the estimation of the long run 
parameters, estimation efficiency may be improved if they are treated accordingly 
(Pesaran et al, 2000). Whilst it is clear that shocks to the shifters are logically prior to 
the prices and hence contemporaneously causal for them, the issue of long-run weak 
exogeneity is largely an empirical issue. It is conceivable that the evolution of prices 
feeds back on to the shifters, affecting trade (the supply shifter) or the topicality of 
media interest in health and safety issues (the demand shifter).  Using the restricted 
model given by (17) and (18) the null of weak exogeneity is firmly rejected for each 
shifter confirming the endogeneity of the shifters in the system.
12
 
The generalised impulse response function developed by Koop et al. (op. cit.) and  
Pesaran and Shin (op. cit.), which explicitly allows for the dynamic interactions 
between the variables in a system following a specific shock, offers a convenient tool 
with which to investigate what might be more appropriately called ‘long-run’ 
responses – the eventual impact that one might observe following a shock to one of 
the variables.  Given the discussion in section 4, we treat the shocks to the shifters as 
contemporaneously causal for meat prices and Figure 3 shows the simulated effect of 
a shock of typical size (one standard error, or 79% of the mean) to the meat scares 
index on all meat prices in the twelve months following this hypothetical shock
13.  
 
There are two obvious outcomes from the impact on prices following the food scare. 
First, shocks to the meat scares index leads to a decline in the price of beef whereas 
the prices of substitute meats rise. Estimates suggest that the retail prices of pork and 
lamb rise by 0.8% (1.20 p/kg) and 1.8% (4.85 p/kg) respectively, while retail beef 
prices fall by around 0.3% (0.70p/kg) following a one standard error shock. This 
would seem to imply that following the BSE scare, consumers reduced their demand 
for beef, but increase demand for substitute meats.  In effect, the results suggest that 
consumers do not simply stop buying beef following heightened concerns about its 
safety, but rather they switch at least part of their beef consumption into lamb and 
pork.  Whilst these ‘knock-on’ effects are unsurprising, their quantification 
underscores the usefulness of impulse response analysis in the inter-related market 
setting, since they cannot be inferred directly from estimates from the cointegrating 
                                                           
12 For each shifter (i), the null of weak exogeneity is tested using a likelihood ratio statistic proposed by 
Johansen (1992) of the restrictions  0 2 , 1 , = α = α i i . The resulting χ  test statistics (of 26.9 and 









14 The second result to note is the differential effect on beef prices at the 
retail and farm stages.  Thus while the retail price of beef falls by around 0.7p/kg, the 
farm gate price of beef falls by 1.81p/kg, suggesting a ‘pass-back’ coefficient of 2.59. 
Clearly, shocks at the retail level have far greater impact on farmers than retailers. 
Figure 3:  The Simulated Dynamic Effect of a (one standard error) Shocks to 























On the supply side, BSE impacted on the national herd via the international ban on 
UK exports of beef cattle and products and the cull of infected and older cattle.   
Figure 4 charts the simulated effect of a typical (i.e. a one standard error, –6,458 
tonne) shock on the retail and producer price of beef. Both prices decline following 
the reduction in exports but farm gate prices fall 3.38p/kg whereas retail prices fall by 
1.15p/kg, implying a ‘pass-through’ elasticity of 0.34. These results are consistent 
with our observation of (18) that market power will affect the retail-farm spread. If 
market power did not matter, the demand shock would not have a differential effect 
on farm and retail prices (see equation 8)
15.  
 
The empirical results relating to the UK beef sector and transmission between retail 
and farm prices highlight three important issues in mapping out the appropriate 
econometric strategy when market power may be playing a role. The first is to draw a 
link between theory and the econometric strategy. Specifically, if market power is 
likely to be important, this will determine the nature of the cointegrating relationship. 
Second, if cointegration in the presence of shifters is identified, one can formally 
detail the structure of the cointegrating equation. Third, only then is it appropriate to 
investigate the impulse response functions mapping out the dynamics between retail 
and farm level prices. The results for the beef sector outlined above highlight the 
relevance of applying this methodology. 
                                                           
14 Given the strength of the substitution between the various red meats, the partial food scare elasticity 
of retail beef prices (0.118 at mean values) gives a poor estimate of the total elasticity (of 0.003 at 
mean values).  
15 To put these price transmission elasticities in context, with perfect competition the ‘pass-through’ 
elasticity should equal the share of the raw commodity in the industry cost function while the ‘pass-
back’ elasticity should reflect the reciprocal of the share of the raw commodity in the industry cost 
function. Under fairly reasonable assumptions, imperfect competition serves to reduce the pass-
through elasticity while increasing the pass-back elasticity. 
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Figure 4:  The Simulated Dynamic Effect of a (one standard error) Fall in 





















As noted in the introduction, we have collected data for 9 other sectors in the UK. 
Results for other commodity sectors are consistent with the detailed results we have 
shown for the beef sector and highlight the significance of our approach
16. As such, 
the procedure for the beef sector outlined above can be applied to these sectors with 
the resulting impulse response functions having a firm grounding in the theoretical 
models that highlight the role of market power in the food sector. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions  
This paper has focused on tying empirical studies of price transmission with the 
underlying theory that highlights a role for market power in determining the outcome. 
The departure point has related to econometric studies of price transmission that focus 
on price pairs only, our premise being that cointegration tests relating to price pairs 
only are inappropriate for addressing whether market power is likely to play a role. 
We have shown that there is a tie between theory and the appropriate specification of 
the cointegrating relationship which provides a formal basis for addressing the role of 
market power. It is only with the appropriate specification that analysis of imperfect 
price transmission via impulse response functions becomes meaningful and that 
directly ties theory with the empirics. We have applied this framework to 10 
commodity sectors in the UK, most of which confirm the importance of our approach. 
We have detailed the relevance of our approach with a detailed analysis of price 
transmission in the UK beef sector. The results suggest that market power in the UK 
food sector is likely to have played a role in determining price transmission between 
retail and farm prices. This is consistent with the overall concerns of the Competition 
Commission but is inconsistent with the recent report commissioned by DEFRA 
covering the same subject. However, given the lack of formal structure underlying the 
framework applied in the latter, we doubt whether the results reported there can be 
used to draw the conclusions that have been reported. In contrast, our approach is both 
tied to theory and hence is more meaningful in interpreting the overall results. In 
addition, it is straightforward to apply. 
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